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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are the largest 
economies and the biggest trade and investment partners of the world economy. 
The relations between the EU and the US are vigorous and are rooted in centuries 
of shared economic and political heritage. In this article, trade relations between 
the EU and the US after the Second World War are examined. Besides the trade 
data between the parties, the investment data are also evaluated to provide insight 
into the magnitude of the transatlantic marketplace. The aim of the paper is to 
inquire whether the newly-initiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership pledges new dimensions and expansions to the existing relations or 
just a new sight to the status quo. The paper offers an appraisal and evaluation of 
the trade relations, taking into consideration the main trade disputes, and it 
intends to provide a precise assessment of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership.  
Keywords: European Union, United States, EU-US Relations, Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership 
 
EKONOMİK HAMİLİKTEN TRANSATLANTİK TİCARET VE 
YATIRIM ORTAKLIĞINA: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK 
DEVLETLERİ ARASINDA YENİ-NESİL BİR İLİŞKİ Mİ?  
Öz 
Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri dünya ekonomisinin en büyük 
ticaret ve yatırım ortaklarıdır. Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri 
arasındaki ilişkiler yüzyıllardır paylaşılan ekonomik ve siyasi bir miras üzerine 
inşa edilmiş olan güçlü bir ilişkidir. Bu çalışmada, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında 
Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasındaki ticari ilişkiler 
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incelenmiştir. Transatlantik pazarın büyüklüğü hakkında fikir vermesi amacıyla 
taraflar arasındaki ticaret verilerinin yanı sıra yatırım verilerine de yer verilmiştir. 
Çalışmanın amacı, yeni başlatılan Transatlantik Ticaret ve Yatırım Ortaklığı’nın 
var olan ilişkiye yeni boyutlar ve açılımlar mı kazandıracağını, yoksa mevcut 
duruma yeni bir görünüş mü vereceğini sorgulamaktır. Çalışmada kullanılan 
yöntem, Transatlantik Ticaret ve Yatırım Ortaklığı’nı tam anlamıyla 
değerlendirebilmek amacıyla belli başlı ticari anlaşmazlıkları da dikkate alarak 
taraflar arasındaki ticari ilişkileri belirlemek ve değerlendirmektir.   
Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Avrupa Birliği 
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri İlişkileri, Transatlantik Ticaret ve Yatırım Ortaklığı  
 
Introduction  
In the long history relations between the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (US), the Cold War era constitutes a distinctive age. Following the Second 
World War, the US acted as a mentor to the Europe both in the economic and 
political affairs via the instrument of the Marshall Plan. Soon after the EU’s fast 
economic recovery, trade disputes appeared between the parties arising from trade 
protectionism. Then, the initiatives for a closer economic cooperation started in 
1990s not only to prevent the accelerated trade disputes between the EU and the 
US, but also to diminish the negative welfare effects of trade protectionism on the 
world economy as a whole. After a series of initiatives and declarations, 
negotiations for a more vigorous relationship, named as the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), was launched in July 2013, based on the 
recommendations of the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth on 
February 2013 (The High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 2013). 
This article inquiries into the particularities of the TTIP and it is structured as 
follows: In the first part of the article, trade relations between the EU and the US 
after the Second World War are examined with the consideration of their main 
trade disputes. Besides the trade issues, the initiatives for a closer economic 
cooperation taken before the TTIP are also evaluated. Then, the negotiations on the 
TTIP are addressed. In the second part, a macroeconomic analysis of the TTIP is 
provided, concentrating mainly on the bilateral trade and foreign direct investment 
flows. Along with the statistical data, the effects of the barriers on the trade and the 
foreign direct investment flows between the EU and the US are also assessed.  
1. Trade Relations Between the European Union and the United States: 
From Economic Protectorate to Partnership   
The economic and political relations between the EU and the US have a very 
long and important background and they are subject to many comprehensive 
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history books, theses and papers in economics and politics. However, this paper 
limits its examination with the post- Second World War era and the trade relations 
between the parties. Trade relations after the Second World War are examined in 
three sub-sections. In the first sub-section, the economic protectorate years are 
evaluated in general. In the second sub-section, the trade disputes between the 
parties are highlighted together with the various attempts and initiatives for a closer 
economic cooperation. The negotiations on the TTIP agreement are assessed in the 
last sub-section. 
1.1. Relations within the Era of Economic Protectorate: 1947-1960  
The US emerged from the Second World War as the strongest military and 
economic power. The leaders of the US were aware of the fact that it had global 
responsibilities which could not be evaded; as well as its own security and 
economic interests. Henry L. Stimson’ following statement can be cited as a 
reflection of the perceptions of the Americans on the responsibilities of the US 
towards the European countries: “We Americans face a challenging opportunity, 
perhaps the greatest ever offered to a single nation. It is nothing less than a chance 
to use our full strength for the peace and freedom of the world […] The troubles of 
Europe and Asia are not other people’s troubles, they are ours” (Stimson, 1947: 5-
7).  
In March 1947, President Harry Truman outlined the US commitment to the 
Western Europe known as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was a 
pledge of American support for the freedom of the peoples. It opened up a new 
phase in US foreign policy giving it a new safeguarding mission. However, this 
mission would be more efficient and the pledge of support would be more certain if 
the European countries themselves had a stronger economic structure and 
performance. Nevertheless, the Truman Doctrine did not provide such a broader 
scope. A new and a broader economic recovery plan was needed to meet the 
deficiencies of the Western Europe (Urwin, 1991: 15-16).  
Before examining the economic recovery plan, it would be helpful to have an 
overview of Western European economy after the Second World War. Certainly, 
wartime economic destruction was extensive. For example; 1.8 million buildings 
were damaged and nearly one-quarter of them were “beyond repair”; 115 railroad 
stations were “severely damaged or destroyed”, and most of the farmlands 
“transformed into dangerous minefields” in France (Eichengreen, 2007: 54). 
“Eighty five percent of Italy’s merchant marine had been destroyed besides of its 
railway capacity, industrial plant and equipment” (Eichengreen, 2007: 54). In 
“Germany, most of the buildings were severally damaged”; almost its entire rail 
network had become of order (Eichengreen, 2007: 54-55).Furthermore, industrial 
production decreased dramatically (Eichengreen, 2007: 55).  
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The commitment for a European Recovery Program was proposed by the 
Secretary of State, George C. Marshall on June 1947. He suggested that the US 
was ready to consider a comprehensive program of economic assistance for 
European recovery. According to him, European economies suffered from severe 
problems, deteriorated prewar trade patterns had not been improved and European 
countries were unable to pay for the importation of food and other necessary 
commodities. Marshall assumed that the US assistance would break the vicious 
cycle of decline and restore the confidence of the European people in the economic 
future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole (Jackson, 1979: 1043-
1044).  
There have been various interpretations of Marshall’s suggestions. Some of the 
interpretations described the Marshall’s suggestions as a symbol of US generosity 
and humanitarianism and as a cornerstone in the developing Cold War era 
(Osgood, 1953; Price, 1955). Some other interpretations accepted the suggestions 
as a need of US capitalism to save itself by controlling and channeling Europe’s 
economies (LaFeber, 1967; Freeland, 1972). Furthermore, a few of them assumed 
the suggestions as a bureaucratic way of solving the military occupation of 
Germany (Gimbel, 1976).   
The financial aid allocated by the Marshall Plan was generous. The Plan 
devoted 15 billion dollar over five years to sending food and providing grants and 
loans to rebuilt Europe at a time when the American GDP was 250 billion dollar a 
year (Walker, 1997: 24-25). The Marshall Plan was successful in many respects. 
The industrial production rose by 62 percent in two years in the Western Europe as 
a whole (Walker, 1997: 24-25). West Germany’s foreign trade doubled between 
1949 and 1950 and the country’s steel production increased to 14.5 million tons in 
1953 when it was 2.5 million tons in 1946 (Walker, 1997: 24-25). Along with the 
extraordinary recovery in industrial production in West Germany, the signs of the 
recovery were modest in Britain, France and Italy.  
Apart from the financial aid, the Marshall Plan also gave impetus to a 
prospective European integration. In 1949, the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the body which implemented the Marshall Plan, 
delivered a new plan for the integration of the European economy. According to 
the plan, which is usually referred to as the Hoffman Plan, integration of the 
European economy was not just an idea but a practical necessity (Walker, 1997: 
24-25).  
Soon after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
barriers on the free flow of international trade became one of the controversial 
issues between the EEC and the US. The 1950s witnessed a steady increase in the 
tariffs of the European countries, such as France, Germany and Italy, which 
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decided to sustain further protection of their domestic producers. Throughout the 
1950s, the European countries and the US could not agree on the balance of trade 
concessions because both sides preferred the protectionist status quo (Dür, 2008: 
655).  
On the other hand, the prospect of a loss of market access was particularly an 
issue of concern for the US exporters because the EEC consisted of almost one-
third of the US exports in 1958 (Krause, 1968). The probability of a trade diversion 
after the establishment of the EEC was one of the most threatening issues for the 
US, as well as for the other non-member countries. According to Piquet, Kreinin 
and Benoit, the US exports of electrical and industrial machinery, machine tools, 
certain chemicals and cars would likely suffer from trade diversion (Piquet, 1958: 
133; Kreinin, 1959: 618; Benoit, 1961: 172).  
Alongside of the prospect of a loss of market access and negative economic 
effects of trade diversion, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was 
launched by the EEC in 1962 also increased the tensions in the US with the 
anticipation of further welfare losses. The prospect of the United Kingdom’s 
accession to the EEC increased the worries of the US; mainly due to the 
consideration of the possibility of accompanying preferential trade arrangements 
with the Commonwealth countries (Dür, 2008: 656). The CAP has been the most 
comprehensive policy of the EEC, introducing variable levies on various goods 
with the aim of restricting agricultural imports to maintain the commodity prices 
set by the EU in advance.  In sum, the EEC and the US entered the 1960s with the 
probable as well as new-born Atlantic trade disputes in their agenda.  
1.2. Relations in the Era of Trade Disputes and Closer Economic 
Cooperation Initiatives: 1960-2013 
The 1960-2013 period is characterized by various trade disputes between the 
EC/EU and the US alongside the attempts for a closer economic cooperation 
between the parties. The disputed trade issues and increased economic inter-
dependence paved the way for the search for a closer, structured and 
institutionalized economic relationship in 1990s. The main reason of the trade 
disputes in the 1960-2013 period were the protection on agricultural goods and 
non-agricultural sectors.    
1.2.1 Main Trade Disputes: Protection on Agricultural Goods  
The 1960s were the years of trade disputes between the EEC and the US, and 
the main disputed issue was the CAP of the EEC. In most cases, the US claimed 
that the CAP of the EEC was infringing the rules of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). On the other hand, the EEC defended the CAP as being 
an internal policy without any international trade effects (Swinbank, 2005: 70).  
36                                 TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 
 
  
The first remarkable trade dispute between the parties was in 1962. The US 
complained about the quantitative restrictions on products for which France and 
Italy had granted tariff concessions GATT Dillon Round. This was the first GATT 
legal complaint by the US against the EEC. It might be argued that the primary aim 
of these complaints was to warn the EEC against further expansion of the CAP. 
The US waiver had set a precedent for the EEC to protect and support farm 
incomes under CAP and the complaints against France and Italy were settled with 
promises of trade liberalization on some certain products.  
The most well-known trade dispute between the EEC and the US was on 
poultry exports and is usually referred to as the “chicken war” of 1961-1964. The 
reason of the chicken war was the European Commission’s suspension of all of its 
GATT tariff bindings on variable levy products. Although this kind of a 
withdrawal was legally permitted, the European Commission was required to pay 
compensation in the form of tariff concessions on the other products. However, the 
countries were free to implement their own trade restrictions if they did not find the 
new tariff concessions adequate.  
The reason of the chicken war was the US’s refusal of the compensation 
offered for Germany’s withdrawal from the GATT binding on poultry. The US 
declared that it would retaliate by withdrawing of its own concessions that equaled 
to 44 million dollar worth of European Community (EC) trade and retaliated by 
boosting tariffs to some EU exports of agricultural commodities (Hudec, 1988: 26). 
Hence the chicken war was under way. The EC declared the retaliation as an 
unbalanced one and the dispute was submitted to the GATT Panel. The chicken 
war ended after the decision of the GATT Panel for a retaliation of 26 million 
dollar (Hudec, 1988: 26-27).   
In 1970s, the EC initiated a new policy referred to as the Global Mediterranean 
Policy that included various trade concessions to the Mediterranean neighboring 
countries. These trade concessions, which included tariff reductions in industrial 
products and favors in agricultural imports, caused trade disputes between the EEC 
and the US.  
Trade disputes between the EC and the US began with the EC’s tariff 
preferences on citrus products granted to favor of the Mediterranean exporters. The 
dispute was settled down with an agreement on seasonal tariff concessions on US 
citrus exporters. Actually, this citrus problem brought a political settlement in 
1970s, referred to as Casey-Soames agreement between the parties on the EU’s 
trade preferences initiatives to the Mediterranean and African countries (Hudec, 
1988: 28).  
The citrus problem arose in 1980s once again and the US, which had a right for 
compensation imposed higher import duties on pasta imported from the EC. As a 
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response, the EC retaliated by increasing the import duties on nuts and lemons 
imported from the US. The EC and the US solved the problem, known as the ‘pasta 
case’ bilaterally, by signing an Agreement on Pasta, and the EC accordingly 
reduced its subsidies on pasta (Swinbank, 2005: 71).  
In 1980s, dispute on the hormones in beef was one of the most controversial 
trade disputes between the EC and the US. The EC prohibited the import of meat 
and meat products from the US claiming that the livestock were treated with 
certain hormones. Thus, the dispute on the hormones has affected the relations 
between the parties since 1988 when the EU banned imports of beef treated with 
certain growth-promoting hormones. In 1996, the US took the EC ban to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system. The WTO dispute 
settlement system gave the US the right to impose trade sanctions on the EC 
exports. The EC exports which were affected by the sanctions were bovine and 
swine meat products, Roquefort cheese, chocolate, juices, jams and fresh truffles. 
The dispute on the hormones in beef had continued for years. The final agreement 
which was concluded in May 2009 provided for a gradual reduction in US 
sanctions on EU products and a gradual increase in the EU tariff quota for high 
quality hormone-free beef (European Parliament, 2012).  
Nevertheless, the longest trade dispute in history as the EU itself acknowledges 
was the banana dispute. The banana dispute or as usually referred the ‘banana war’ 
had continued for twenty years. The reason of the banana dispute was the EC 
banana import regime. The import regime provided preferential treatment for 
bananas imported from the former colonies of some EC member states, mostly 
from the Africa and Caribbean and Pacific. The Lóme Convention provided the 
preferential access to the EU market for the exports of the African and Caribbean 
and Pacific countries in order to give assistance to their economic development. On 
the other hand, the US together with several Latin American countries argued that 
the banana import regime of the EU was dampening their domestic producers.  
The banana dispute continued for twenty years and finally ended on November 
2012 with an agreement signed between the EU and Latin American countries, 
settling the longest-running series of disputes in the history of the multilateral 
trading system (WTO, 2012a). The Geneva Banana Agreement (WTO, 2009) was 
agreed by the EU, the Latin American countries and the US in December 2009. 
Since then, the legal requirements like the ratification of the Agreement by each 
country and the EU’s legislation for the implementation had come to an end and 
the Geneva Banana Agreement is a multilateral agreement now, just like the other 
WTO multilateral agreements. The trade disputes on the agricultural goods 
continued in 2000s. The DS 174 – EC – Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (WTO, 2005a) 
and DS166 - US - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten 
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from the EC (WTO, 2000) and DS291 – EC – Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products (WTO, 2006a) can be given as example cases.  
Besides the above-mentioned examples, trade in the genetically modified (GM) 
foods also constitutes a significant problem between the EU and the US. The 
problem arises because of the different regulatory regimes on the GM foods within 
the EU and the US (Lester, Barbee, 2013: 855). The EU relies on what it refers to 
as the precautionary principle which means that the EU requires significant 
evidence before approving new products. Thus, the EU producers have to 
demonstrate the safety of the GM crops and food products before they can be 
approved for sale and clearly label contents of the food which contains more than 
0.9 percent GM ingredients (European Parliament and the Council, 2003a; 
European Parliament and the Council, 2003b). On the other hand, the GM foods 
are considered as equivalent with the unmodified foods and products in the US and 
thus there is no additional oversight in the absence of scientific proof that any harm 
is caused by their sale or consumption (Kysar, 2004: 557).   
The assessment of Echols (Echols, 1998: 526) might constitute a brief 
conclusion on the trade disputes on the agricultural goods between the EU and the 
US. According to Echols, strong domestic influences on food and dietary practices 
still remain in especially Europe despite the globalization on the food industry and 
trade. The culture and attitudes of European citizens have tended to favor 
traditional foods and minimal processing and being skeptical to the new 
technologies. This skepticism has slowed the EU’s broader regulatory process as 
well as some governmental approvals within the EU. On the other hand, Americans 
have been keener to accept the new technologies but skeptical of some traditional 
production techniques. Certainly, these differences in the approaches create 
regulatory and market access problems due to the time lag. The US which is the 
faster part in the approval and implementation of a new technique, expects to have 
the opportunity to enter the EU market without local competition. 
1.2.1 Main Trade Disputes: Protection on Non-Agricultural Sectors  
Apart from the agricultural disputes, the trade dispute on carbon steel was an 
exemplary case of the trade relations between the EU and the US. The dispute 
began in 2002 with the US’s imposition of safeguard measure on steel. Actually, 
the trade dispute on steel had domestic political roots in the US. During the 
presidential election campaign in 2000, George W. Bush promised to help to the 
domestic steel producers. Thus, the imposition of safeguard measure can be 
regarded as an attempt to guarantee the elections when the roles of steel producing 
States were considered (Read, 2005: 136).  
The imposition of safeguard measures on steel not only affected the EU but 
also Japan, Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, Brazil and New Zealand. 
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However, the world-wide concern was on the dispute between the EU and the US. 
The EU responded to the safeguard measures immediately with an announcement 
that a retaliatory action would be taken to protect the EU steel industry. The EU 
imposed temporary safeguard measures in this respect to its steel imports. These 
measures were product-specific and comprised of a tariff quota (Read, 2005: 161). 
The WTO Panel concluded in May 2003 that the safeguard measures imposed by 
the US were inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards 
(WTO, 2003a).  
This resolution could be considered as a relatively fast conclusion when 
compared with the past ever-lasting disputes. The world very welcomed this 
speedy resolution as the parties avoided a new potential trade war that could 
damage the international trading system as well as the credibility of the WTO and 
its Panel decisions.   
Apart from the steel dispute, the most well-known and long-lasting non-
agricultural trade dispute between the EU and the US was in aerospace sector. The 
main reason of the trade dispute in aerospace sector was the subsidies of both the 
EEC and the US to their domestic industries. Actually, the dispute began in 1974 
with the entrance of the Airbus, the European aerospace company to the market. 
Airbus is a government-based consortium of companies from France, Germany, 
Great Britain and Spain. Airbus had been subsidized for almost two decades and 
developed its first aircrafts in 1990s. By 1990s, it had captured about one-third of 
the world market for large commercial jets. It had succeeded to close the 
technological gap with the Boeing, the leading US producer and became the 
second largest aircraft producer of the world, replacing the McDonnell Douglas of 
the US. Meanwhile the McDonnell Douglas was facing a probable bankruptcy 
(Tyson, 1992: 155-156).  
The US had to respond to the Airbus challenge in order to prevent job losses 
and unemployment in the domestic aerospace sector. On the other hand, the EC 
justified the government subsidies that served for the development cost of the first 
Airbus output, the A-300 with the infant-industry argument and the US monopoly 
in the aerospace sector. After almost two decades with conflicts, the EU and the 
US reached a bilateral agreement on trade in large civil aircraft in 1992. The 
agreement regulated various forms of government financing used in the aerospace 
sector. It also provided several measures restraining government subsidies on the 
launch of a new aircraft. Moreover, the agreement gave parties the right to monitor 
the implementation of the agreement (Pavcnik, 2002: 741-742).  
The bilateral agreement on trade in large civil aircraft agreed in 1992 had more 
or less decreased the disputes in the aerospace sector until the launch of Airbus A-
380 which directly challenged Boeing 747. Then the US questioned whether the 
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EU subsidies for the development of A-380 were compatible with the 1992 
agreement and the WTO subsidy agreement. The borrowing terms of the 
production of A-380 were compatible with the 1992 agreement. However, the US 
claimed that the financing did not comply with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures that was considered as having precedence over the 
1992 agreement (Pavcnik, 2002: 744).  
In 2004, the US unilaterally withdrew from the 1992 Agreement and filed a 
WTO challenge to all the EU support given to Airbus. It requested formal WTO 
consultations with the EU regarding subsidization of Airbus by the EU. Upon the 
request of the US, a WTO Panel was set up. The timing of the withdrawal from the 
1992 agreement was striking. It coincided with the time right as Boeing was about 
to lose its leading market share in the aerospace sector. As a response, the EU 
requested immediately to start the WTO dispute settlement procedure against the 
US subsidies directed towards Boeing.  
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a Panel in July 2005. It took 
almost five years to decide on the Report. Finally, the WTO Panel Report was 
circulated to the parties on 30 June 2010 (WTO, 2010). The Panel Report was from 
a neutral perspective without clear winner or loser even though both the Airbus and 
the Boing announced victory afterwards (Baskett, 2010: 13-14). After the 
circulation of the Panel Report to the parties, both the EU and the US appealed to 
the WTO again citing certain issues of the rulings. Then, the Appellate Body 
Report was circulated to the parties in May 2011 (WTO, 2011).  
The Appellate Body upheld the WTO Panel’s finding that certain subsidies 
provided by the EU and certain EU member state governments to Airbus are 
incompatible to the Article 5 (c) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures1 because they have caused serious prejudice to the interests of the US. 
On the other hand, a separate dispute brought by the EU against the US for 
subsidies allegedly provided to Boeing is currently before the Appellate Body 
(WTO, 2012b). Hence, the history of the trade dispute in the aerospace sector so 
far justifies a never-ending story of the leading actors.  
Apart from the disputes on steel sector and aerospace sector, there are various 
trade disputes between the EU and the US. Some of them are the DS165 - US – 
Import Measures Imposed by the US on Certain EC Products, DS176 – US – 
                                                            
1 Article 5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: No Member should cause, 
through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, of adverse effects to the 
interests of other Members, i.e.: a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; b) nullification 
or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in 
particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; c) serious prejudice to the 
interests of another Member. This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural 
products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
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Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (WTO, 2002), DS212 – US – 
Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the EC (WTO, 
2005b), DS217 – US – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset (WTO, 2003b), 
DS294 – US – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping 
Margins (Zeroing) (WTO, 2007) and DS315 – EC – Selected Customs Matters 
(WTO, 2006b).   
When the trade disputes in recent years are examined broadly, it is understood 
that most of them are related with the non-tariff barriers especially in the form of 
regulatory issues. Thus, the regulatory convergence as well as regulatory 
cooperation should constitute the core element of a closer economic cooperation 
between the EU and the US.   
1.2.2 Initiatives for a Closer Economic Cooperation before the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership  
The EU and the US share a very dynamic, mutually beneficial economic 
relationship consisting of about 12 percent of the world’s population and 
approximately 50 percent of the world’s gross domestic product despite various 
trade disputes. In spite of the rise of the Asian economies, with China as the 
leading country, trade and investment relations between the EU and the US are still 
considerably high. Thus, a closer trade and investment partnership would not only 
affect the parties but also the world economy as a whole.  
Although the trade and investment relations between the EU and the US have 
always been important in the past decades, 1990s was a very pivotal era. There 
were several reasons for upgrading the relations. The end of the Cold War by itself 
was precisely a very important and strategic factor. In 1990, the US proposed a 
Transatlantic Declaration to reaffirm the solidarity between the EC and the US 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the Transatlantic Declaration 
mainly focused on security issues, there was an increased emphasis on the 
economic aspects. The completion of the European Internal Market by 1992 could 
be considered as another important factor that reinforced upgrading of the 
relations. The US could not remain indifferent to the world’s largest internal 
market as the biggest trade and investment partner of the EU. 
Moreover, increased trade and investment relations between the EU and the US 
have created new demands for an increased market access. However, in 1990s, 
both European and American multinational companies identified various 
regulatory frameworks for goods and services as the most important barriers to 
international trade between the parties. The standards, testing and verification 
procedures are deemed as far more harmful and costly than the tariffs and quotas. 
As such, these regulatory frameworks are regarded as the non-tariff barriers to the 
Transatlantic trade. By decreasing the differences in the regulatory issues and 
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harmonizing the framework, both the EU and the US hope to benefit via reducing 
the costs and increasing the competitiveness of the Transatlantic economy (Ahearn, 
2011: 4).   
The initiatives in 1990s for closer trade and economic partnership could also be 
interpreted with a pragmatic approach. After the successful completion of the long-
lasting Uruguay Round, it seemed logical that the two leading economies of world 
trade could work together to resolve their existing trade problems and in this 
process be a role model to be pursued by the rest of the world. In this way, they 
would help the acceleration of the progress towards a freer world trade (Schott, 
Oegg, 2001: 745).   
Actually, institutionalizing the economic relations between the EU and the US 
has always been on the political as well as economic agenda of the parties. 
However, there has been a shift from traditional trade policy issues like decreasing 
the import tariffs or quotas to the issues like increased and secured market access 
and harmonizing trade-related domestic policies (Langhammer, Piazolo, Siebert, 
2002: 161).  
The process of institutionalization of the relations began on 27 February 1990 
with the Transatlantic Declaration which aimed to establish an institutional 
framework for regular and intensive consultation between the parties. The 
Declaration foresaw biannual EU and US Summit meetings and specified three 
major areas to cooperate, namely economic liberalization, cooperation in 
education, science and culture, and cooperation in combatting against international 
crime, terrorism and environmental degradation.   
Although the Transatlantic Declaration specified crucial cooperation areas, the 
cooperation instruments and procedures were not specified explicitly. Thus, the 
Declaration soon required new, supplementary agreements or protocols to clarify 
the cooperation process. In this context, the New Transatlantic Agenda was signed 
in 1995 which identified four priority areas for closer cooperation. These areas 
were: promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the 
world, responding to global challenges, contributing to the expansion of world 
trade and promoting closer economic relations, and, building bridges across the 
Atlantic among business people, scientists, the academia, and so on.  
Alongside the New Transatlantic Agenda, the EU and the US also adopted a 
Joint Action Plan which specified some specific policy areas where deeper 
cooperation could be attained. The most ambitious policy area in the Joint Action 
Plan was about strengthening of the multilateral trading system and liberalization 
of the international trade. It also established a new governance system for the 
relations besides the EU/US Summit, namely the Senior Level Group and the New 
Transatlantic Agenda Task Force. Nevertheless, the most promising part of the 
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Joint Action Plan was the plan to establish a new transatlantic marketplace through 
enhanced regulatory cooperation without any mention of a free trade area (Pollark, 
2003: 5-9).  
The Plan was provided with a substance in March 1998 in a European 
Commission Communication (European Commission, 1998) without an explicit 
mention of a free trade area at least for trade in goods. Although a proper definition 
of the transatlantic marketplace was not made in the proposal, the elimination of 
the tariffs on industrial goods by 2010 was planned. On the other hand, the 
proposal foresaw a free trade area for trade in services. But the European 
Commission’s initiative for the establishment of a transatlantic marketplace failed 
because of the French veto.  
Meanwhile, the trade disputes between the EU and the US continued in 1990s 
despite the Transatlantic Declaration and Joint Action Plan. A firmer commitment 
was needed to settle the trade disputes between the parties like the disputes on 
bananas, the aerospace sector and so on. Thus, the parties agreed on a 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership in May 1998 which aimed to abolish the 
bilateral regulatory barriers to trade and to determine common positions on the 
WTO negotiations. The Transatlantic Economic Partnership was different than the 
proposal for the transatlantic marketplace in many respects. It set up a mechanism 
of regular dialogue in order to sustain closer cooperation and it contained many 
proposals to examine and compare the policies of the parties (Hindley, 1999: 45-
46). The parties agreed on an Action Plan which identified areas for common 
actions both bilaterally and multilaterally with a timetable for their achievement. 
(Transatlantic Economic Partnership: Action Plan, 1999: 24).  
The initiatives in 2000s to strengthen the relations between the EU and the 
USare examined thoroughly, it is seen that they had primarily focused on the issues 
of securing market access and harmonizing trade related domestic policies without 
mentioning a free trade area or a transatlantic marketplace.Thus, following the 
acceptance of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership Action Plan, a Steering 
Group as well as specialized working groups on specific issues of the Action Plan 
such as  the Working Group on Technical Barriers to Trade and Working Group on 
Food Safety, were set up.  
The initiatives for the further development of the transatlantic relations gained 
an impetus with the Germany’s Presidency of the EU during the first half of 2007. 
In the EU Presidency Statement (German Presidency of the European Union, 2007) 
on the Transatlantic Relations to the Plenary of the European Parliament on 25 
April 2007, it was stated that strengthening of joint transatlantic action and 
developing the EU’s relations with the US, both in policy making and business and 
in energy security and climate protection were among the central objectives of the 
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German Presidency. According to the Presidency, the different regulatory 
approaches both in the EU and the US had been producing a heavy burden of 
transaction costs, and thus, a further elimination of the non-tariff barriers was 
needed. The core of the initiative was a mutual political commitment to deepen 
cooperation with a view to achieve regulatory convergence and a further 
intensification of economic links (German Presidency of the European Union, 
2007).  
A significant success of the German Presidency was the agreement on the 
Framework for Advancing Economic Integration between the EU and the US at the 
EU-US Summit on 30 April 2007 (European Union External Action, 2007). 
Moreover, the parties established the Transatlantic Economic Council to oversee 
the efforts outlined in the Framework. Nevertheless, while the parties were 
negotiating on the Framework for Advancing Economic Integration between the 
EU and the US and agreeing on a Transatlantic Economic Council, the Boing-
Airbus dispute was on the agenda of the WTO.  
At the EU-US Summit in November 2010, the parties tasked the Transatlantic 
Economic Council to strengthen the transatlantic economic ties by promoting 
innovation, streamlining regulations and eliminating barriers to trade and 
investment. The parties underlined the importance of generating new opportunities 
for jobs and growth (European Commission, 2011). At the November 2011 
Summit, the parties established the High Level Working Group on Jobs and 
Growth.  
1.3  Negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Agreement  
The High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth which was established to 
identify policies and measures to increase the trade and investment between the EU 
and the US to support mutually beneficial job creation, economic growth and 
international competitiveness issued its interim report on 19 June 2012 (The High 
Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 2012). In its interim report, the High 
Level Working Group reached the preliminary conclusion that a comprehensive 
transatlantic trade and investment agreement would be the option with the greatest 
potential for supporting jobs and promoting growth and competitiveness across the 
Atlantic.  
The High Level Working Group concluded in its final report (The High Level 
Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 2013) “that a comprehensive agreement that 
addresses a broad range of bilateral trade and investment issues, including  
regulatory issues, and contributes to the development of global rules would provide 
the most important mutual benefit of the various options they have considered. The 
co-chairs of the parties recommended to the leaders that each party initiate as soon 
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as possible the domestic procedures to launch the negotiations on a comprehensive 
trade and investment partnership.  
On the basis of the recommendations of the High Level Working Group, the 
US President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy 
and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso announced on 13 
February 2013 that they would initiate the internal preparations for the launch of 
the negotiations (European Commission, 2013a). Thus, backed with a long period 
of preparations, the first round of negotiations for the TTIP agreement began on 8 
July 2013 in Washington and ended on 12 July 2013. The sixth round of 
negotiations will begin on 13 July 2014. 
Regarding the scope of the negotiations, the negotiating groups have set out 
respective approaches and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the 
TTIP is set to cover at the first round of negotiations. They included market access 
for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy 
and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, 
intellectual property rights, sustainable development, small and medium sized 
enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation and stat-
owned enterprises (European Commission, 2013b).  
The second round of negotiations for TTIP agreement started on 11 November 
2013 and ended on 15 December 2013. The parties discussed investment rules, 
trade in services, energy and raw materials, as well as regulatory issues, technical 
barriers to trade and sectoral issues. Regarding the investments, the discussions 
continued on comparing respective approaches to investment liberalization and 
protection. On services, the parties compared their respective approaches on cross-
border services, financial services, telecommunications and e-commerce. 
Regarding the regulatory issues, both the EU and the US agreed on horizontal rules 
and specific commitments in sectors. On energy and raw materials, they continued 
talks on how to develop a common approach to addressing the challenges they both 
face (European Commission, 2013c).  
The third round of negotiations initiated on 16 December 2013 and ended on 21 
December 2013. Negotiators made progress on the three main parts of the TTIP, 
namely market access, regulatory aspects and rules and these were expected to be 
the main topics of the next round of negotiations (European Commission, 2013d). 
The fourth round of negotiations began on 10 March 2014 and finalized on 14 
March 2014. There was a steady progress in the market access, regulatory aspects 
and rules. The parties also continued to look for the ways to achieve greater 
regulatory compatibility in pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, medical devices, 
automotive and chemicals industries (European Commission, 2014). The fifth 
round of negotiations started on 19 May 2014 and finished on 23 May 2014. The 
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negotiators moved from discussing a conceptual framework to defining specific 
ideas for addressing the majority of the negotiating areas (Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 2014). The last round is the sixth round which will be 
held on 13 July 2014.These negotiation rounds have constituted important steps for 
overcoming the obstacles in EU-US trade relations and establishing closer 
cooperation.US President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman 
Van Rompuy and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso have also 
made it clear that reducing regulatory barriers to trade and investment would be 
one of the most important ways through which the TTIP would help the EU and 
the US to foster their economies (European Commission, 2013e).  
2. A Macroeconomic Outlook to the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership  
It is apparent from the previous sub-section that the negotiations on the TTIP 
agreement are on track.  Thus, before evaluating the potential benefits of a 
comprehensive transatlantic partnership, it would be necessary to examine the 
macroeconomic outlook. To evaluate the Partnership in macroeconomic terms, 
trade and foreign direct investment flows between the EU and the US are analyzed 
in this sub-section. Then, the effects of the barriers on trade and foreign direct 
investment flows between the EU and the US are discussed.   
2.1.  Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Flows between the EU and the 
US 
The trade and investment have always been the essential determinants of the 
relations between the EU and the US. The two economies constitute roughly half 
of the world output and trade. Moreover, they are each other’s important 
investment partners.  
2.1.1. Trade Flows  
The trade flows are examined for the 1999-2013 period due to the lack of 
regular SITC data for the previous years at the Eurostat database. Trade flows 
between the EU and the US during 1999-2013 can be seen at Figure 2.1. According 
to the Figure, the EU has a trade surplus on its overall trade with the US. The 
volume of trade decreased in 2009, reflecting the negative effects of the global 
financial crisis in the US in 2008. Nevertheless, it began to increase rapidly after 
2010 until 2012. Then, the volume of trade slightly decreased in 2013.  
According to Eurostat, the US is the third major import partner of the EU in 
2013, constituting almost 11.6 percent of the total imports of the EU from other 
countries. The biggest import partner of the EU is China with a share of 16.6 
percent and Russia is the second with a share of 12.2 percent. The US constitutes 
the biggest export partner of the EU at the same year having a 16.5 percent within 
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the total exports of the EU to the non-member countries. Switzerland and China 
follows the US with the shares of 9.7 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1: EU Trade with the US (1999-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s own table based on data from Eurostat (2014). 
 
On the other hand, the EU is the second major import and export partner of the 
US in 2013 having 15.8 percent within the total imports of the US from the world 
and 16.5 percent within the total exports of the US to the world. The biggest import 
partner of the US is China with a share of 18 percent while Canada is the biggest 
export partner of the US with a share of 18.3 percent.  
The data above gives a brief outlook to the dimensions of the trade between the 
EU and the US. Nevertheless, a detailed data is required so as to analyze the trade 
flows thoroughly. Thus the trade between the parties by SITC (Standard 
International Trade Classification) Section is examined at Figure 2.2 and Figure 
2.3 so as to understand the characteristics of the international trade.   
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Figure 2. 2: Imports of the EU from the US by SITC Section (1999-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s own table based on data from Eurostat (2014) 
 
Figure 2.2 displays that within the imports of the EU from the US by SITC 
Section during 1999-2013; the biggest share belongs to the Machinery and 
Transport Equipment despite the decreasing trend after 2000. The decline within 
the Machinery and Transport Equipment imports starts to increase after 2010. On 
the other hand, the imports of the Chemicals and Related Products, N.E.S. (Not 
Classified Elsewhere) has a steady increase except the dramatic decrease in 2007, 
constituting the second biggest imports of the EU from the US. Miscellaneous 
Manufactured Articles is the third biggest import Section having a more or less 
stationary trend.   
According to the Figure 2.3, the biggest SITC Section within the exports of the 
EU to the US is the Machinery and Transport Equipment though its fluctuating 
trend. Chemicals and Related Products, N.E.S. is following the Machinery and 
Transport Equipment with a steady increase. The other biggest export Sections are 
the Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles and the Manufactured Goods Classified 
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Chiefly by Material. Depending on the import and export data, it should be 
remarked that there is an intra-industry trade2 especially in the Machinery and 
Transport Equipment Section as well as in the Chemicals and Related Products, 
N.E.S. Section and Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles Section.  
 
Figure 2.3: Exports of the EU to the US by SITC Section (1999-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s own table based on data from Eurostat (2014) 
 
Intra-industry trade refers to a two-way trade in the same industry or in the 
differentiated commodities. A large portion of the output of the industrialized 
economies today involves differentiated rather than homogeneous products. Intra-
industry trade arises so as to take advantage of positive economies of scale in 
production (Salvatore, 2007: 179). The proportion of intra-industry trade within the 
world trade has steadily grown over the last half-century. Intra-industry trade has a 
                                                            
2 The measurement of intra-industry trade relies on an industrial classification system that categorizes 
commodities into different industries (Krugman, Obstfeld, Melitz, 2012: 199). The level of intra-
industry trade is measured by the intra-industry trade index (T) in which T= 1− |𝑋−𝑀|
𝑋+𝑀
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bigger share in the trade of manufactured commodities among industrialized 
countries accounting the majority of the world trade (Krugman, Obstfeld, Melitz, 
2012: 199).  
At this point, the intra-industry trade within the above-mentioned SITC 
Sections requires a queried in terms of the market access conditions for a proper 
assessment of the TTIP. In that sense, the study of Ecorys (2009) is a leading one 
in determining the non-tariff barriers imposed on the trade between the EU and the 
US. Table 2.1 gives a brief summary of the Ecorys main non-tariff barriers 
findings imposed on the trade between the parties.  
According to the Table 2.1 that gives a brief summary of the Ecorys findings, 
the non-tariff barriers within the Machinery and Transport Equipment Section and 
the Chemicals and Related Products, N.E.S. Section in which there is the intra-
industry trade are relatively high though the classification of the industries does not 
accurately represents the SITC Sections. Nevertheless, this finding refers to a 
troubled market access within the industries in which most of the overall trade 
between the parties is going on and emphasizes the strategic importance of 
achieving the regulatory convergence within the TTIP.  
Table 2.1: Perceived Non-Tariff Trade Barriers Index on Selected Commodities 
(Index between 0-100) 
 
EU exports US exports 
   Machinery Industry 50.9 36.5 
Automotive Industry 34.8 31.6 
Aerospace and Space Industry 56.0 55.1 
Chemicals Industry 45.8 53.2 
Cosmetics Industry 48.3 52.2 
Source: Ecorys (2009).  
 
2.1.2 Foreign Direct Investment Flows  
After examining the trade flows between the EU and the US, it would be 
essential to hold an opinion on the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows which is 
regarded as one of the fundamental ingredients of the TTIP. Figure 2.4 
demonstrates that the US has the biggest share within the extra EU-27 FDI inward 
stocks during 2001-2012. However, it should be remarked that while the total extra 
EU-27 FDI inward stocks during 2001-2012 are tripled, the US’s share within the 
inward stocks is only doubled. This finding might refer to some problems relating 
with barriers on the free flow of the FDI between the EU and the US.  
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Figure 2.4: EU Foreign Direct Investment Inward Stocks by Main Partners (billion 
Euro) (2001-2012) 
 
Source: Author’s own table based on data from Eurostat (2014) 
 
When the extra EU-27 FDI outward stocks during 2001-2012 are examined 
from Figure 2.5, the US’s leading share is attracting the attendance. However, the 
increase of the share of the US within the extra EU-27 FDI outward stocks is very 
low. These findings about the outward FDI stocks together with the findings about 
the inward FDI stocks trigger to various anticipations like the prominent regulatory 
barriers on the free flow of the FDI or the loose of the attractiveness of making an 
investment in the EU and the US. The parties might find it more profitable to 
invest in another emerging economy. Determining the reasons of the decrease of 
the FDI shares requires further analysis and analytical examination. 
Based on the leading study of the Ecorys (2009), the Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (CEPR) prepared a Report in 2013 in which it examines the non-
tariff barriers on the trade and investment between the EU and the US. According 
to the CEPR Report (2013), the highest non-tariff barriers on the free flow of FDI 
between the EU and the US are on the aerospace industry, automobile industry, 
chemicals and cosmetics industry, textiles, clothing, footwear industry, paper and 
wood products industry and the transportation services. Hence, for a closer 
Transatlantic economic partnership, the FDI flows between the EU and the US 
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should be stimulated via negotiating on the non-tariff barriers imposed on the 
investments.   
Figure 2.5: EU Foreign Direct Investment Outward Stocks by Main Partners 
(billion Euro) (2001-2012) 
 
Source: Author’s own table based on data from Eurostat (2014) 
 
2.2. The Effects of the Barriers on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
Flows between the EU and the US  
Upon the start of the talks on the TTIP, many studies have been conducted on 
the possible economic effects of this partnership. Among them, Felbermayr et. al. 
(2013) analyzed the effects of the TTIP on Germany based on the assumption that 
the TTIP would bring the same average trade liberalization effects as previous 
German free trade agreements with other partners. According to Felbermayr et. al. 
(2013), the gain for Germany in terms of output is relatively low when compared 
with that of the US. IFO (2013) found out that with the TTIP, the wages of the 
unskilled workers in Germany would increase more than the skilled workers. 
Fontagné et. al (2013) presented results for a reference liberalization scenario and 
four additional scenarios for the EU-27, the US, the UK, Germany, France and the 
Eastern European EU countries. Erixon and Bauer (2010) examined only the 
effects of liberalizing trade in goods. Welfens and Irawan (2014) focused in mainly 
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on the sectoral output and employment effects of the TTIP for Germany, the EU 
and the US.  
When the barriers on trade between the EU and the US considered, the tariffs 
do not constitute an important obstacle on the free flow of trade. According to the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Report, the EU imposes 3.5 percent 
tariff rate on goods as an average while the US imposes 1.5 percent. The EU 
imposes 14.6 percent tariff rate on processed foods and 8 percent on motor vehicles 
as the highest tariff rates while the US imposes 3.3 percent and 1.2 percent, 
respectively (CEPR, 2013: 14). Even though the average tariff rates are relatively 
low, the non-tariff barriers mostly in the form of domestic regulations constitute a 
substantive impediment for trade flows. However unlike the tariffs, it is not always 
easy to abolish the non-tariff barriers when they are used for domestic aims.  
Although the importance of the non-tariff barriers on the free flow of trade as 
well as for investment is definite, it is not so easy to determine them definitely. 
Ecorys (2009) achieved to gather the data of the non-tariff barriers that are 
imposed on the transatlantic trade and investment.  
According to the Ecorys leading study, the US imposes relatively higher non-
tariff barriers to services than the EU, highest in communication, construction, 
travel and transport. When the goods and services sectors are compared in terms of 
the imposition of non-tariff barriers, it is understood that both the EU and the US 
protects their goods sectors via non-tariff barriers more than their services sector. 
Among the goods sectors, the most protected sector is the aerospace and space 
industry both in the EU and the US. Cosmetics, chemicals, medical measuring and 
testing appliances, biotechnology and machinery are following the aerospace and 
space industry. On the other hand, the EU imposes relatively higher non-tariff 
barriers to the pharmaceuticals, textiles, clothing and footwear, wood and paper 
and paper products.  
As in the case of the determination of the non-tariff barriers, it is also though to 
identify the macroeconomic effects of an abolishment or at least a reduction of the 
tariff and non-tariff barriers on the transatlantic trade and investment. The studies 
in this respect mostly refer to an independent report prepared by the CEPR (CEPR, 
2013). This in-depth report gives a detailed outlook of the current transatlantic 
trade and investment and the barriers on the free flow of them. The study covers an 
economic modelling3 to estimate the potential impact of different policy scenarios. 
                                                            
3 The CEPR study reviews the importance of bilateral economic relationship and provides a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) based estimates for the economy wide impact of reducing tariffs and non-
tariff barriers. The estimates are provided with regards to expected changes in GDP, sector output, 
aggregate and bilateral trade flows, wages and labor displacement among other issues. The analysis uses 
the GTAP8 database (projected to 2027) in conjunction with the non-tariff barrier estimates reported in 
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Furthermore, the study highlights not only the gains of the EU and the US from the 
so-called partnership, but also the benefits for the world economy as a whole.  
The CEPR study examines two different policy alternatives for liberalizing the 
trade and investment between the EU and the US. The first alternative is the partial 
agreement alternative that foresees liberalization only in the tariffs, services or 
procurement. The second alternative is a comprehensive one that stipulates 
liberalization in the tariffs, services, as well as in the non-tariff barriers on goods 
and services. The comprehensive alternative has two options: First, a less 
ambitious liberalization that includes a 10 percent reduction in trade costs arising 
from the abolishment of the non-tariff barriers and 98 percent tariff removal. 
Second, an ambitious liberalization includes a 25 percent reduction in trade costs 
arising from the abolishment of the non-tariff barriers and 100 percent tariff 
removal (CEPR, 2013).  
The summary of the CEPR report on the macroeconomic effects of the 
liberalization of trade and investment between the EU and the US is given in Table 
2.2. As Table illustrates, positive gains for both economies is expected. 
Nevertheless, it should be recalled the data ought to be interpreted as changes 
relative to a projected 2027 global economy. Regarding the change in the GDP, the 
increase in the GDP of the EU is more than the increase in the GDP of the US in 
all the policy alternatives. Bilateral exports will also increase in all the policy 
alternatives. The increase is tremendous especially in the comprehensive 
agreement policy alternative. Notwithstanding, the increase in the EU exports to 
the US is more than the increase in the US exports to the EU in all the policy 
alternatives except the limited agreement which has only a tariff reduction. 
However, the increase within the total exports of the EU and the US in the 
comprehensive agreement policy alternative is very remarkable. The increase 
constitutes almost 220 billion euros for the EU and 240 billion euros for the US.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
the Ecorys (2009) study. The study investigates different policy options for the deepening of the 
bilateral trade and investment relations. One of the policy options is limited in scope of barriers 
addressing only the tariffs only, services only or procurement only. The other policy option concerns a 
comprehensive liberalization agenda that covers simultaneously tariffs, procurement, non-tariff barriers 
on commodities and non-tariff barriers on services.  
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Table 2.2: Macroeconomic Effects of the Liberalization of Trade and Investment 
between the EU and the US 
 Limited 
agreement: 
tariffs only 
Limited 
agreement: 
services 
only 
Limited 
agreement: 
procurement 
only 
Comprehensive 
agreement: less 
ambitious 
Comprehensive 
agreement: 
ambitious 
Change in GDP     
EU, 
million 
euros 
23,753 5,298 6,367 68,274 119,212 
US, 
million 
euros 
9,447 7,356 1,875 49,543 94,904 
Bilateral exports f.o.b     
EU to 
US, 
million 
euros 
43,84 4,591 6,997 107,811 186,965 
US to 
EU, 
million 
euros 
53,777 2,859 3,411 100,909 159,098 
Total exports f.o.b.     
Extra-
EU, 
million 
euros 
43,74 5,777 7,136 125,232 219,97 
US, 
million 
euros 
57,33 5,488 5,942 142,071 239,543 
Note: Estimates should be examined as changes relative to a projected 2027 global economy. 
Source: CEPR (2013: 3). 
 
Conclusion  
The history of economic relations between the EU and the US is a very long 
one with a network of affinities and commitments. But admittedly, the economic 
relations after the Second World War are the evidences of a unique era in which 
the foundations of an economic partnership that would comprise the world’s 
largest market are laid down. After the economic protectorate years, the EU 
became the leading trade and investment partner of the US. However, this special 
partnership was accompanied by significant trade disputes. The grounds of these 
trade disputes were the trade protectionism, mostly implemented with regard to the 
agricultural goods as well as industrial commodities. The implementation of the 
CAP of the EU by itself constituted the main reason of the trade disputes on 
agricultural goods. Among the various disputed non-agricultural sectors that were 
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not taken into examination in this paper as a whole, the steel sector and the 
aerospace sector might be referred as the most troublesome ones in terms of trade 
protectionism. It should be noted that the trade dispute between the EU and the US 
in the aerospace sector is one of the most complex, long and costly disputes within 
the GATT/WTO history which has not been properly resolved yet.  However, the 
trade disputes both in the agricultural and industrial goods have still been 
continuing in 2000s. And not surprisingly, the main disputing issue is the 
regulatory convergence.   
In the meantime, the initiatives for a closer economic cooperation began in 
1990s. Actually, the scope of the initiatives was vague, reflecting both the EU’s 
and the US’s hesitations on the announcement of an aspired –even dreamy- 
transatlantic free trade area. After the adaptation of the Transatlantic Declaration 
in 1990, the parties committed themselves with the New Transatlantic Agenda. 
However, this commitment neither solved the existing trade disputes nor prevented 
new ones. Thus, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership was announced in 1998 as 
a further commitment with the aim of facilitating the market access and 
harmonizing trade related domestic policies without mentioning a free trade area 
between the parties. The search for a comprehensive and efficient economic 
relationship has been finalized with the decision on the establishment of the TTIP. 
The negotiations of this newly-introduced partnership began in July 2013 with high 
prospects and expectations.  
At this juncture, two striking points should be clarified so as to understand the 
importance of the TTIP for the EU and the US as well as for the world economy. 
The first point is the timing of the launch of the negotiations on the TTIP and the 
second is the role of the regulatory cooperation within the TTIP. Regarding the 
timing of the launch of the negotiations on the TTIP, the leaders and the policy 
makers both in the EU and the US were looking for something to boost their 
economies after the catastrophic global financial crises of 2008. The EU was 
frustrated by the monetary problems and limited financial freedom and such a 
launch would refresh the economic confidence on the EU economy.  On the US 
side, the main motivation for launching the TTIP might be to eliminate EU 
concerns that the US had written her off in its pivot to Asia (Ikenson, 2013: 24). 
Regarding the second point about the role of the regulatory cooperation within the 
TTIP, the examination of the trade and investment flows between the EU and the 
US has a strategic importance.  
During the examination of the trade flows between the EU and the US, it was 
impossible to access to the trade data by SITC Section from 1960 on. So as to 
present an analogous and convenient data, the 1999-2013 period is also analyzed. 
When the trade flows between the EU and the US during 1999-2013 are examined, 
the trade surplus of the EU on its trade with the US constitutes one of the important 
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points. In 2013, the US was the third biggest import partner and the major export 
partner of the EU while the EU was the second major import and export partner of 
the US. Within the imports of the EU from the US by SITC Section during 1999-
2013, the biggest share belongs to the Machinery and Transport Equipment while 
the Chemicals and Related Products, N.E.S. constitutes the second. The 
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles which remains the third biggest share has a 
more or less stationary trend. Within the exports of the EU to the US at the same 
period, the Machinery and Transport Equipment is the leading Section. The 
Chemicals and Related Products, N.E.S., the Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 
and the Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material are following the 
Machinery and Transport Equipment Section.  
According to the trade flows data, there seems an intra-industry trade especially 
in the Machinery and Transport Equipment Section as well as in the Chemicals and 
Related Products, N.E.S. Section and Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 
Section. According to the Ecorys (2009) leading study, the non-tariff barriers in 
these industries are relatively high. So as to enjoy the increasing economies of 
scale arising from the intra-industry trade, the parties should achieve the regulatory 
cooperation and abolish or at least decrease the existing non-tariff barriers in 
advance. Essentially, this economic rationale might be regarded as the fundamental 
reason of the significance of achieving the regulatory cooperation and negotiating 
on the non-tariff barriers within the TTIP.  
On the other hand, before concluding on the FDI flows between the EU and the 
US, it should be reminded that it was unfortunately impossible to reach to the data 
before the 2000s. Thus, the data of 2001-2012 period is taken into examination in 
which the free movement of capital is more liberalized. Depending on the FDI 
flows during 2001-2012, the US has the biggest share within the extra EU-27 FDI 
inward as well as outward stocks. Though the US constitutes the major FDI partner 
of the EU both in the inward and outward stocks, the decreasing trend in its share 
is also remarkable. The reason of this decreasing trend could be either the non-
tariff and regulatory barriers or the attractiveness of investing in the emerging 
economies. The CEPR Report (2013) highlighted that there are non-tariff barriers 
on the free flow of FDI between the EU and the US and the highest impositions are 
on the aerospace industry, automobile industry, chemicals and cosmetics industry, 
textiles, clothing, footwear industry, paper and wood products industry and the 
transportation services.  
Though it is hard to evaluate the TTIP properly before the end of its negotiation 
process, the positive outcomes of the elimination of the barriers on trade and 
investment are evident. The leading, independent CEPR Report (2013) refers to 
non-tariff barriers as the most efficient restriction on the free flow of transatlantic 
trade and investment. Furthermore, the Report estimates the macroeconomic 
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effects of the liberalization of trade and investment between the EU and the US in 
terms of changes with regard to a projected 2027 global economy. According to the 
estimates of the CEPR Report, both the EU and the US will experience GDP 
growth but the increase in the GDP of the EU will be higher than the US. Although 
the parties will experience an improvement in bilateral exports, the remarkable 
increase will be on the total exports of the EU and the US in the comprehensive 
liberalization alternative. As a sum up, the latest transatlantic initiative referred to 
as the TTIP is at the early stages of negotiation and will be shaped depending on 
the interests of the negotiators. Admittedly, the most anticipated outcome of the 
TTIP is a permanent settlement in the long-lasting trade disputes and binding 
commitments to refrain from new ones. Such an outcome would lead to a freer 
world trade and thus would help in increasing the global welfare as a whole.  
It should be stated that the TTIP is substantially different than the previous 
closer economic cooperation initiatives considering its probable outcomes. If the 
negotiations on the TTIP agreement can be successfully concluded, the EU and the 
US can decide and shape the global trade and investment rules together. In other 
words, they can act on behalf of the WTO in determining and imposing the rules of 
global economy. This new role based on the TTIP can hinder the legal and the 
moral status of the WTO and its members. Another probable outcome of the TTIP 
can be its impact on the other trade partners of the EU and the US. The parties, 
especially the EU, have a cobweb of preferential trade relations spread all over the 
world. Certainly, the TTIP would affect the countries which are part of this 
preferential trade cobweb differently because of trade creation or diversion or 
dynamic effects arise from Transatlantic market integration. These probable 
outcomes entail further research and examination on the effects of the TTIP and 
are out of the scope of this paper. To conclude, it should be admitted that the 
economic protectorate for the EU comes to its end and a new era of an equal 
economic footing has started together with the introduction of the TTIP, reflecting 
a new-age relationship.   
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